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THE GLOBAL 2000 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 
ENTERING THE TWENTy-FIRST CENTURY 
Gus Speth* 
MAJOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
If present trends continue, the world in 2000 will be more 
crowded, more polluted, less stable ecologically, and more vulnera-
ble to disruption than the world we live in now. Serious stresses 
involving population, resources, and environment are clearly visi-
ble ahead. Despite greater material output, the world's people will 
be poorer in many ways than they are today. 
For hundreds of millions of the desperately poor, the outlook for 
food and other necessities of life will be no better. For many it will 
be worse. Barring revolutionary advances in technology, life for 
most people on earth will be more precarious in 2000 than it is 
now-unless the nations of the world act decisively to alter current 
trends. 
This, in essence, is the picture emerging from the U.S. Govern-
ment's projections of probable changes in world population, re-
sources, and environment by the end of the century, as presented 
* The Global 2000 Study, initiated by President Carter in 1977, is a three-year effort by 
the federal government to discover the long-term implications of present world trends in 
population, natural resources and the environment. The report was prepared by the Presi-
dent's Council on Environmental Quality of which Gus Speth is Chairman, in conjunction 
with the Department of State and eleven other federal agencies. Gerald O. Barney is the 
study director. Global 2000 was transmitted to President Carter on July 24, 1980. The fol-
lowing is an edited version of the report. Copies of the report in its entirety may be obtained 
from the Superintendent of Documents. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
20402. 
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in the Global 2000 Study. They do not predict what will occur. 
Rather, they depict conditions that are likely to develop if there 
are no changes in public policies, institutions, or rates of techno-
logical advance, and if there are no wars or other major disrup-
tions. A keener awareness of the nature of the current trends, how-
ever, may induce changes that will alter these trends and the 
projected outcome. 
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS 
Rapid growth in world population will hardly have altered 2000. 
The world's population will grow from 4 billion in 1975 to 6.35 bil-
lion in 2000, an increase of more than 50 percent. The rate of 
growth will slow only marginally, from 1.8 percent a year to 1.7 
percent. In terms of sheer numbers, population will be growing 
faster in 2000 than it is today, with 100 million people added each 
year compared with 75 million in 1975. Ninety percent of this 
growth will occur in the poorest countries. 
While the economies of the less developed countries (LDC's) are 
expected to grow at faster rates than those of the industrialized 
nations, the gross national product per capita in most LDC's re-
mains low. The average gross national product per capita is pro-
jected to rise substantially in some LDC's (especially in Latin 
America), but in the great populous nations of South Asia it re-
mains below $200 a year (in 1975 dollars). The large existing gap 
between the rich and poor nations widens. 
World food production is projected to increase 90 percent over 
the thirty years from 1970 to 2000. This translates into a global per 
capita increase of less than 15 percent over the same period. The 
bulk of that increase goes to countries that already have relatively 
high per capita food consumption. Meanwhile per capita consump-
tion in South Asia, the Middle East, and the LDC's of Africa will 
scarcely improve or will actually decline below present inadequate 
levels. At the same time, real prices for food are expected to 
double. 
Arable land will increase only 4 percent by 2000, so that most of 
the increased output of food will have to come from higher yields. 
Most of the elements that now contribute to higher 
yields-fertilizer, pesticides, power for irrigation, and fuel for ma-
chinery-depend heavily on oil and gas. 
During the 1990's world oil production will approach geological 
estimates of maximum production capacity, even with rapidly in-
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creasing petroleum prices. The Study projects that the richer in-
dustrialized nations will be able to command enough oil and other 
commercial energy supplies to meet rising demands through 1990. 
With the expected price increases, many less developed countries 
will have increasing difficulties meeting energy needs. For the one-
quarter of humankind that depends primarily on wood for fuel, the 
outlook is bleak. Needs for fuelwood will exceed available supplies 
by about 25 percent before the turn of the century. 
While the world's finite fuel resources-coal, oil, gas, oil shale, 
tar sands, and uranium-are theoretically sufficient for centuries, 
they are not evenly distributed; they pose difficult economic and 
environmental problems; and they vary greatly in their amenabil-
ity to exploitation and use. 
Nonfuel mineral resources generally appear sufficient to meet 
projected demands through 2000, but further discoveries and in-
vestments will be needed to maintain reserves. In addition, pro-
duction costs will increase with energy prices and may make some 
nonfuel mineral resources uneconomic. The quarter of the world's 
population that inhabits industrial countries will continue to ab-
sorb three-fourths of the world's mineral production. 
Regional water shortages will become more severe. In the 1970-
2000 period population growth alone will cause requirements for 
water to double in nearly half the world. Still greater increases 
would be needed to improve standards of living. In many LDC's, 
water supplies will become increasingly erratic by 2000 as a result 
of extensive deforestation. Development of new water supplies will 
become more costly virtually everywhere. 
Significant losses of world forests will continue over the next 
twenty years as demand for forest products and fuelwood in-
creases. Growing stocks of commercial-size timber are projected. to 
decline 50 percent per capita. The world's forests are now disap-
pearing at the rate of 18-20 million hectares a year (an area half 
the size of California), with most of the loss occurring in the humid 
tropical forests of Africa, Asia, and South America. The projections 
indicate that by 2000 some 40 percent of the remaining forest 
cover in LDC's will be gone. 
Serious deterioriation of agricultural soils will occur worldwide, 
due to erosion, loss of organic matter, desertification, salinization, 
alkalinization, and waterlogging. Already, an area of cropland and 
grassland approximately the size of Maine is becoming barren 
wasteland each year, and the spread of desert-like conditions is 
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likely to accelerate. 
Atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and ozone-deplet-
ing chemicals are expected to increase at rates that could alter the 
world's climate and upper atmosphere significantly by 2050. Acid 
rain from increased combustion of fossil fuels (especially coal) 
threatens damage to lakes, soils, and crops. Radioactive and other 
hazardous materials present health and safety problems in increas-
ing numbers of countries. 
Extinctions of plant and animal species will increase dramati-
cally. Hundreds of thousands of species-perhaps as many as 20 
percent of all species on earth-will be irretrievably lost as their 
habitats vanish, especially in tropical forests. 
The future depicted by the U.S. Government projections, briefly 
outlined above, may actually understate the impending problems. 
The methods available for carrying out the Study led to certain 
gaps and inconsistencies that tend to impart an optimistic bias. 
For example, most of the individual projections for the various sec-
tors studies-food, minerals, energy, and so on-assume that suffi-
cient capital, energy, water, and land will be available in each of 
these sectors to meet their needs, regardless of the competing 
needs of the other sectors. More consistent, better-integrated pro-
jections would produce a still more emphatic picture of intensify-
ing stresses, as the world enters the twenty-first century. 
ENTERING THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY· 
The world in 2000 will be different from the world today in im-
portant ways. There will be more people. For every two persons on 
the earth in 1975 there will be three in 2000. The number of poor 
will have increased. Four-fifths of the world's population will live 
in less developed countries. Furthermore, in· terms of persons per 
year added to the world, population growth will be 40 percent 
higher in 2000 than in 1975. 
The gap between the richest and the poorest will have increased. 
By every measure of material welfare the study provides-per cap-
ita GNP and consumption of food, energy, and minerals-the gap 
will widen. For example, the gap between the GNP per capita in 
the LDC's and the industrialized countries is projected to grow 
• Footnotes omitted. 
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from about $4,000 in 1975 to about $7,900 in 2000. Great dispari-
ties within countries are also expected to contin~e. 
There will be fewer resources to go around. While on a world-
wide average there was about four-tenths of a hectare of arable 
land per person in 1975, there will be only about one-quarter hec-
tare per person in 2000 (see Figure 11 below). By 2000 nearly 1,000 
billion barrels of the world's total original petroleum resource of 
approximately 2,000 billion barrels will have been consumed. Over 
just the 1975-2000 period, the world's remaining petroleum re-
sources per capita can be expected to decline by at least 50 per-
cent. Over the same period world per capita water supplies will 
decline by 35 percent because of greater population alone; increas-
ing competing demands will put further pressure on available 
water supplies. The world's per capita growing stock of wood is 
projected to be 47 percent lower in 2000 than in 1978. 
The environment will have lost important life-supporting capa-
bilities. By 2000, 40 percent of the forests still remaining in the 
LDC's in 1978 will have been razed. The atomspheric concentra-
tion of carbon dioxide will be nearly one-third higher than 
preindustrial levels. Soil erosion will have removed, on the average, 
several inches of soil from croplands allover the world. Desertifica-
tion (including salinization) may have claimed a significant frac-
tion of the world's rangeland and cropland. Over little more than 
two decades, 15-20 percent of the earth's total species of plants 
and animals will have become extinct--a loss of at least 500,000 
species. 
Prices will be higher. The price of many of the most vital re-
sources is projected to rise in real terms-that is, over and above 
inflation. In order to meet projected demand, a 100 percent in-
crease in the real price of food will be required. To keep energy 
demand in line with anticipated supplies, the real price of energy is 
assumed to rise more than 150 percent over the 1975-2000 period. 
Supplies of water, agricultural land, forest products, and many 
traditional marine fish species are projected to decline relative to 
growing demand at current prices, which suggests that real price 
rises will occur in these sectors too. Collectively, the projections 
suggested that resource-based inflationary pressures will continue 
and intensify, especially in nations that are poor in resources or are 
rapidly depleting their resources. 
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The world will be more vulnerable both to natural disaster and 
to disruptions from human causes. Most nations are likely to be 
still more dependent on foreign sources of energy in 2000 than they 
are today. Food production will be more vulnerable to disruptions 
of fossil fuel energy supplies and to weather fluctuations as cultiva-
tion expands to more marginal areas. The loss of diverse germ 
plasm in local strains and wild progenitors of food crops, together 
with the increase of monoculture, could lead to greater risks of 
massive crop failures. Larger numbers of people will be vulnerable 
to higher food prices or even famine when adverse weather occurs. 
The world will be more vulnerable to the disruptive effects of war. 
The tensions that could lead to war will have multiplied. The po-
tential for conflict over fresh water alone is underscored by the fact 
that out of 200 of the world's major river basins, 148 are shared by 
two countires and 52 are shared by three to ten countries. Long-
standing conflicts over shared rivers such as the Plata (Brazil, Ar-
gentina), Euphrates (Syria, Iraq), or Ganges (Bangladesh, India) 
could easily intensify. 
Finally, it must be emphasized that if public policy continues 
generally unchanged the world will be different as a result of lost 
opportunities. The adverse effects of many of the trends discussed 
in this Study will not be fully evident until 2000 or later; yet the 
actions that are necessary to change the trends cannot be post-
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poned without foreclosing important options. The opportunity to 
stabilize the world's population below 10 billion, for example, is 
slipping away; Robert McNamara, President of the World Bank, 
has noted that for every decade of delay in reaching replacement 
fertility, the world's ultimately stabilized population will be about 
11 percent greater. Similar losses of opportunity accompany 
delayed perceptions or action in other areas. If energy policies and 
decisions are based on yesterday's (or even today's) oil prices, the 
opportunity to wisely invest scarce capital resources will be lost as 
a consequence of undervaluing conservation and efficiency. If agri-
cultural research continues to focus on increasing yields through 
practices that are highly energy-intensive, both energy resources 
and the time needed to develop alternative practices will be lost. 
The full effects of rising concentrations of carbon dioxide, deple-
tion of stratospheric ozone, deterioration of soils, increasing intro-
duction of complex persistent toxic chemicals into the environ-
ment, and massive extinction of species may not occur until well 
after 2000. Yet once such global environmental problems are in 
motion they are very difficult to reverse. In fact, few if any of the 
problems addressed in the Global 2000 Study are amenable to 
quick technological or policy fixes; rather, they are inextricably 
mixed with the world's most perplexing social and economic 
problems. 
Perhaps the most troubling problems are those in which popula-
tion growth and poverty lead to serious long-term declines in the 
productivity of renewable natural resource systems. In some areas 
the capacity of renewable resource systems to support human 
populations is already being seriously damaged by efforts of pre-
sent populations to meet desperate immediate needs, and the dam-
age threatens to become worse. 
Examples of serious deterioration of the earth's most basic re-
sources can already be found today in scattered places in all na-
tions, including the industrialized countries and the better-en-
dowed LDC's. For instance, erosion of agricultural soil and 
salinization of highly productive irrigated farmland is increasingly 
evident in the United States, and extensive deforestation, with 
more or less permanent soil degradation, has occurred in Brazil, 
Venezuala, and Colombia. But problems related to the decline of 
the earth's carrying capacity are most immediate, severe, and 
tragic in those regions of the earth containing the poorest LDC's. 
Sub-Saharan Africa faces the problem of exhaustion of its re-
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source base in an acute form. Many causes and effects have come 
together there to produce excessive demands on the environment, 
leading to expansion of the desert. Overgrazing, fuelwood gather-
ing, and destructive cropping practices are the principal immediate 
causes of a series of transitions from open woodland, to scrub, to 
fragile semiarid range, to worthless weeds and bare earth. Matters 
are made worse when people are forced by scarcity of fuelwood to 
burn animal dung and crop wastes. The soil, deprived of organic 
matter, loses fertility and the ability to hold water-and the desert 
expands. In Bangladesh, Pakistan, and large parts of India, efforts 
by growing numbers of people to meet their basic needs are dam-
aging the very cropland, pasture, forests, and water supplies on 
which they must depend for a livelihood. To restore the lands and 
soils would require decades-if not centuries-after the existing 
pressures on the land have diminished. But the pressures are grow-
ing, not diminishing. 
There are no quick or easy solutions, particularly in those re-
gions where population pressure is already leading to a reduction 
of the carrying capacity of the land. In such regions a complex of 
social and economic factors (including very low incomes, inequita-
ble land tenure, limited or no educational opportunities, a lack of 
nonagricultural jobs, and economic pressures toward higher fertil-
ity) underlies the decline in the land's carrying capacity. Further-
more, it is generally believed that social and economic conditions 
must improve before fertility levels will decline to replacement 
levels. Thus a vicious circle of causality may be at work. Environ-
mental deterioration caused by large populations creates living 
conditions that make reductions in fertility difficult to achieve; all 
the while, continuing population growth increases further the pres-
sures on the environment and land. 
The declines in carrying capacity already being observed in scat-
tered areas around the world point to a phenomenon that could 
easily be much more widespread by 2000. In fact, the best evidence 
now available-even allowing for the many beneficial effects of 
technological developments and adoptions-suggests that by 2000 
the world's human population may be within only a few genera-
tions of reaching the entire planet's carrying capacity. 
The Global 2000 Study does not estimate the earth's carrying 
capacity, but it does provide a basis for evaluating an earlier esti-
mate published in the U.S. National Academy of Sciences' report, 
Resources and Man. In this 1969 report, the Academy concluded 
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that a world population of 10 billion "is close to (if not above) the 
maximum that an intensively managed world might hope to sup-
port with some degree of comfort and individual choice." The 
Academy also concluded that even with the sacrifice of individual 
freedom and choice, and even with chronic near starvation for the 
great majority, the human population of the world is unlikely to 
ever exceed 30 billion. 
Nothing in the Global 2000 Study counters the Academy's con-
clusions. If anything, data gathered over the past decade suggest 
the Academy may have underestimated the extent of some 
problems, especially deforestation and the loss and deterioration of 
soils. 
At present and projected growth rates, the world's population 
would rapidly approach the Academy's figures. If the fertility and 
mortality rates projected for 2000 were to continue unchanged into 
the twenty-first century, the world's population would reach 10 bil-
lion by 2030. Thus anyone with a present life expectancy of an ad-
ditional 50 years could expect to see the world population reach 10 
billion. The same rate of growth would produce a population of 
nearly 30 billion before the end of the twenty-first century. 
Here it must be emphasized that, unlike most of the Global 2000 
Study projections, the population projections assume extensive 
policy changes and developments to reduce fertility rates. Without 
the assumed policy changes, the projected rate of population 
growth would be still more rapid. 
Unfortunately population growth may be slowed for reasons 
other than declining birth rates. As the world's populations exceed 
and reduce the land's carrying capacity in widening areas, the 
trends of the last century or two toward improved health and 
longer life may come to a halt. Hunger and disease may claim more 
lives-especially lives of babies and young children. More of those 
surviving infancy may be mentally and physically handicapped by 
childhood malnutrition. 
The time for action to prevent this outcome is running out. Un-
less nations collectively and individually take bold and imaginative 
steps toward improved social and economic conditions, reduced 
fertility, better management of resources, and protection of the en-
vironment, the world must expect a troubled entry into the 
twenty-first century. 

